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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND SHORT SUSPENSIONS
FROM THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: PROLOGUE TO GOSS V. LOPEZ
I. Introduction
In the milestone case of Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,'
Judge Richard Rives held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment protects students at public colleges. Before they can be expelled, students
must be given written notice of charges and an impartial hearing which allows
presentation of witnesses and evidence. Subsequent decisions have extended
Dixon to high school suspensions.2 Now the courts agree that public high school
students cannot be suspended for a "substantial" period of time without prior
notice and hearing.?
The courts have not agreed upon the due process requirements when sus-
pensions are for short periods of time. Indeed, the cases disagree on what con-
stitutes "short." Some decisions have upheld suspensions imposed for ten days
and longer without prior hearings.4 Other courts have applied Dixon to shorter
periods, intimating that only seriously disruptive conduct justifies denial of a
prior hearing.5
In 1971 and 1972, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases culminating
in Board of Regents v. Roth6 which delineated revised analytical guidelines for
procedural due process.' Applying these guidelines, two federal district courts
in 1973 extended the prior hearing requirement to all public school suspensions,
short or long.8 The Supreme Court has noted jurisdiction in one of these cases,
Goss v. Lopez,9 and is expected to hear argument during the October term. With
Lopez the Court can resolve the lower court disharmony and formulate a defini-
tive standard for school disciplinary procedures.
II. The Lower Courts and Short Suspensions
Prior to 1969 the federal courts had not faced a short suspension case.
Dixon and its progeny had established procedural guidelines only for long or
1 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). For an interesting dis-
cussion of Dixon's dramatic departure from precedent and subsequent rapid absorption into
the law see Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1028-32 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Wright].
2 E.g., Williams v. Dade County School Board, 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971); Hobson
v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn. 1970); Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools,
306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
3 Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1343, 1346 '(S.D.
Tex. 1969).
4 E.g., Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2nd Cir. 1971); Rumler v. Bd. of School Trustees,
327 F. Supp. 729 (D.S.C. 1971); Banks v. Bd. of Public Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.
Fla. 1970); Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
5 See note 39 and text accompanying notes 33-39 infra.
6 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
7 See note 44 and text accompanying notes 41-54 infra.
8 See text accompanying notes 55-66 infra.
9 Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973), prob. juris. noted sub nom.,
Goss v. Lopez, 94 S.Ct. 1405 (1974).
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indefinite suspensions and expulsions."0 Although there was dicta to the effect
that milder penalties required less substantial safeguards,1 the line between long
and short suspensions remained undefined. Since 1969 the federal courts have
confronted short suspensions over a dozen times in various factual guises. While
the majority of these decisions have not required prior notice and hearing, they
vary substantially in rationale as well as placement of the line dividing long
suspensions from short.
A. Judicial Deference to Educational Authority
Baker v. Downey City Board of Education2 was the first federal decision
to directly confront a short suspension. Two students were suspended for ten
days without notice or hearing for distributing a student publication named
Oink. As required by school regulations, the principal conferred with the stu-
dents' parents two days after the suspension had been imposed.'3 The court
held that this postsuspension conference satisfied due process requirements.
The Baker court's reasoning reveals that deference to the educational system
was its controlling consideration. Madera v. Board of Education' was cited
for the proposition that due process procedures may vary according to the cir-
cumstances:
Law and order in the classroom should be the responsibility of our respective
educational systems. The courts should not usurp this function and turn
disciplinary problems, involving suspensions, into criminal adversary pro-
ceedings-which they definitely are not.'5
The court distinguished temporary suspensions from "drastic disciplinary action"
such as expulsion; for the lesser penalty, concluded Baker, formal procedures
should not be required:
In the instant case, the school officials were charged with the conduct of
the educational program and if the temporary suspension of a high school
student could not be accomplished without first preparing specifications of
charges, giving notice of hearing, and holding a hearing, or any combination
of these procedures, the discipline and ordered conduct of the educational
10 Minimum or "essential" due process safeguards for school suspensions have generally
been defined as prior notice with written specification of charges, an impartial hearing after
time to prepare which shall include an opportunity for both sides to present witnesses and
evidence, and sanctions imposed only on substantial evidence. See Dixon v. Alabama St. Bd. of
Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1961); Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist.,
307 F. Supp. 1328, 1346 (S.D. Tex. 1969); General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure
and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher
Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 147 (W.D. Mo. 1968) '(en banc); Wright, supra note 1 at 1071-74.
11 General Order on judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of
Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133 (W.D.
Mo. 1968) (en banc); Wright, supra note 1, at 1071.
12 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
13 Id. at 522.
14 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967).
15 Id. at 788. Madera never considered whether suspensions require prior notice and




program and the moral atmosphere required by good educational standards,
would be difficult to maintain.'
6
Since Baker was the first case to specifically consider short suspensions, the
reluctance to interfere with educators is understandable and perhaps prudent.
However, this treatment is inadequate in light of subsequent developments in
short suspension case law. For instance, while noting that due process can vary
with the circumstances, Baker failed to consider the possibility of procedures
less demanding than the Dixon safeguards which it rejected but more protective
than the perfunctory postsuspension parental conference.17 Also, the court only
incidentally addressed the highly pertinent issue of the potential harmful effects
of school suspensions.18
Baker is not the only short suspension case that deferred to school authority
without thoroughly exploring pertinent issues. In Farrell u. Joel," high school
students were suspended for fifteen days (later changed to ten) for their part
in a protest against previous school disciplinary actions. During the protest, the
students were advised that their activity violated school rules and that they
would be suspended; however no hearing was held prior to their dismissal.
The court held that under the circumstances due process did not require notice
or a prior hearing.2"
In reaching this holding, the court did not sufficiently consider the student
interest in avoiding a short suspension.2 The Farrell court classified a ten-day
suspension as minor disciplinary action similar to staying after school and extra
homework which do not require formal procedures. Such a categorization
ignores a significant difference between suspensions and other forms of school
discipline: a suspension denies access to education.
Also, in refusing to recognize a constitutional right to notice and hearing
before a ten-day suspension, Farrell gave great weight to the lack of factual
controversy in the particular circumstances under consideration. The suspended
students had admitted they knew their conduct violated school rules. A prior
hearing would have served no purpose except to set a penalty, the court ex-
plained, and therefore was not necessary.2
However, lack of factual controversy is a questionable basis for denying
procedural safeguards. An alleged lack of procedural due process is not answered
by saying that in the particular circumstances undisputed facts justify the sub-
16 Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 522 (C.D. CaL 1969).
17 See note 60 and accompanying text infra.
18 See text accompanying notes 90-97 infra.
19 437 F.2d 160 '(2nd Cir. 1971).
20 Circuit Judge Feinberg had some misgivings about school disciplinary procedures:
Certainly possible unfairness could be avoided in the future by promulgation of
detailed, fair and reasonable procedures to be used when discipline less serious than
expulsion is proposed.... Id. at 163.
21 See text accompanying notes 90-97 infra.
22 437 F.2d at 163. Two other cases withholding Dixon safeguards for short suspensions
also explicitly relied on lack of factual controversy. Tate v. Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d 975 (8th
Cir. 1972) (prior hearing not required for a three-day suspension when there was no question
as to what acts and individuals were involved); Rumler v. Bd. of School Trustees, 327 F.




stantive result.' Rather than resting on lack of factual dispute in the specific
situation, Farrell should have considered whether the procedures employed would
satisfy due process when applied to short suspensions in general .
4
B. Failure to Recognize the Emergency Situation
A general principle of procedural due process is that the need for quick
action by the state in serious emergency situations will overcome the individual
interest in procedural protections. This means that school officials may tem-
porarily suspend students without notice or a prior hearing when their behavior
has seriously disrupted the educational process. 6 Several short suspension deci-
sions are flawed because they failed to recognize this exception to general prior
hearing requirements.
In Banks v. Board of Public Instruction7 the Fifth Circuit considered the
constitutionality of Dade County, Florida, school regulations authorizing a ten-
day suspension without prior hearing. The court discussed Dixon and decided
that any suspension required a hearing, but that for short suspensions, a prior
hearing would disrupt learning. Consequently, the court held that the regulations
in question satisfied due process.2"
The conclusion in Banks that prior hearings for short suspensions would
disrupt learning was reached through a discussion of hypothetical classroom mis-
conduct. 9 The discussion assumed extreme misconduct requiring immediate
removal from school to maintain the learning environment.30 A prior hearing
would require the presence of the teacher and student witnesses, thus only further
disrupting learning by their absence from the classroom. However, this analysis
does not acknowledge that severe misconduct justifies dispensing with a prior
hearing even when normally required." By failing to recognize the emergency
23 Due process does not depend on the existence of factual dispute. See Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 87-88 & n.18 (1972); Black Students ex rel. Shoemaker v. Williams, 317 F.
Supp. 1211, 1214 (M.D. Fla. 1970); Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn.
1970), explained in Note, Student Rights-Dismissal and Due Process, 38 TENN. L. Rav.
112. 117 (1970). The appearance of fairness as well as actual fairness is important:
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.
Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so important to a pop-
ular government, that justice has been done. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951), explained in O'Toole, Summary Suspension
of Students Pending a Disciplinary Hearing: How Much Process Is Due? 1 J. LAw &
EDUC. 383, 390-91 (1972).
24 Another reason to require a hearing even when the student admits misconduct is to
allow argument in mitigation of punishment. See Betts v. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.2d 629, 633
(7th Cir. 1972).
25 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 n.7 & 8 (1972); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
26 For a broader discussion of the emergency situation in the school setting, see text
accompanying notes 119-25 infra.
27 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
28 Id. at 292.
29 Id. at 291.
30 The Banks hypothetical discussion is referred to again in the text accompanying notes
104-08 infra.




exception, Banks avoided the primary question of whether a prior hearing should
be required in nonemergency situations.
3 2
Similar incomplete analysis mars another Fifth Circuit decision, Dunn v.
Tyler Independent School District.' Dunn sustained the right of the school
system to impose three-day suspensions without a prior hearing. The particular
suspensions in question were given for riotous activity that clearly qualified as
an emergency. The three-day suspensions could have been sustained on this
basis alone, and the court to some degree did emphasize the particular facts in-
volved. 4 However, the applicability of the emergency exception was not ex-
plicitly recognized; to this extent, Dunn is not good authority for denying prior
hearings for short suspensions.3 "
Another Fifth Circuit case, Black Students ex rel. Shoemaker u. Williams,"8
unlike Banks and Dunn, recognized the relation of emergency situations to due
process protections. Black Students considered a ten-day suspension to be sub-
stantial and therefore like Dixon. Pervis v. LaMarque37 was cited to explain
that minimal punishment and emergency situations are the only exceptions to
a prior hearing requirement. Thus Black Students is close to the position that,
except in emergencies, any suspension requires a prior hearing. 8
While other decisions have joined the short suspension melee, 9 few have
significantly enriched the conceptual analysis. All decisions prior to 1972 must
be reevaluated in the light of Supreme Court pronouncements in the series of
procedural due process cases which culminated in Board of Regents v. Roth.4"
32 An explanation of Banks in Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299, 301
(5th Cir. 1971) supports the textual analysis: A prior hearing was denied because the "...
need to act quickly and in a manner that could not further disrupt the educational process out-
weighed the student's interest in a prior hearing."
In reality, plaintiff Banks was suspended for apparently nondisruptive behavior, failure
to stand during the pledge of allegiance. Thus, the Banks holding largely rests on hypothetical
reasoning not pertinent to the actual facts of the case.
33 327 F. Supp. 528 (E.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd in part, 460 F.2d. 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
34 460 F.2d at 145.
35 Judge Rives, the author of Dixon, dissented in Dunn and agreed with the District
Court finding that the suspensions were actually indefinite, not short, and therefore required
Dixon protections. 460 F.2d at 147 (Rives dissenting).
36 317 F. Supp. 1211 '(M.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972).
37 466 F.2d 1054 '(5th Cir. 1972) (two-month suspension required a prior hearing).
Judge Rives wrote that punishment requires a prior hearing unless it is only minimal or
imposed in an emergency.
38 Of course this depends on whether a short suspension is considered "minimal punish-
ment." Judge Rives in Pervis seemed to use "minimal punishment" as excluding suspensions,
but this is not clear. 466 F.2d at 1058. In reality, it is difficult to contend that any suspen-
sion is minimal punishment. See text accompanying notes 90-97 infra.
39 Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973)
(prior hearing not required for short suspensions); Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist.,
484 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1973) (brief suspensions without hearing are justified); Linwood v.
Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972) (seven days does
not require prior hearing); Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 '(D.D.O. 1972) (dictum)
(greater than two days requires prior hearing); Tillman v. Dade County School Bd., 327
F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (follows Banks); Jackson v. Hepinstall, 328 F. Supp. 1104
(N.D.N.Y. 1971) (dictum) (five days does not require prior hearing).
40 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (nontenured college teacher's interest in reemployment was not
a liberty or property). Although they are 1973 decisions, Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish
School Bd., 4-72 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973) and Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist., 484
F.2d 1040 '(9th Cir. 1973) do not refer to Roth and do not follow the Roth analysis.
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III. Procedural Due Process and the Supreme Court
Until 1971, the Supreme Court decided procedural due process questions
by applying an imprecise balancing test. The interest of the individual in avoid-
ing a fourteenth amendment deprivation of "life, liberty or property" was bal-
anced against the state interest in summary adjudication.4 ' Beginning with
Boddie v. Connecticut," and extending through several important due process
decisions, a somewhat more systematic approach appeared in the Court's rea-
soning.4' Finally, Roth clearly delineated the new guidelines. The previous
balancing process was relegated to the second part of a two-phase analysis: (1)
Is the individual interest encompassed by the fourteenth amendment "life, liberty,
or property"? (2) If so, what procedures will satisfy the due process require-
ment?4"
The first phase is crucial. If the individual deprivation is not of "life,
liberty, or property," the individual has no constitutional right to any form of
due process protection; if the interest is protected, some form of prior hearing
is required.45 This determination hinges on the "nature" as opposed to the
"weight" of an interest.4" Put differently, the court must ascertain the particular
type of interest involved and decide whether that interest is a "liberty" or "prop-
erty" or neither. During this process, the importance or "weight" of the interest
should be discounted.
41 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970); Cafeteria and Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 866, 894-95 (1961); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-64 (1951); Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process
into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty and a "Specialized
Type of Property ... in Our Economic System," 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 502, 506 (1971).
42 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process requires that indigents cannot be denied access to
divorce proceedings).
43 See Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation requires prior hear-
ing); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (prejudgment replevin without prior hearing
generally violates due process); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license
generally cannot be suspended without a prior hearing on liability).
44 [A] weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the form of hear-
ing required in particular situations by procedural due process. But, to determine
whether due process requirements apply in the first place we must look not to the
"weight" but to the nature of the interest at stake. 408 U.S. at 570-71.
This approach was recently restated:
The applicability of the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process depends
in the first instance on the presence of a legitimate "property" or "liberty" interest
within the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Arnett v. Kennedy,
94 S. Ct. 1633, 1649 (1974) '(Justice Powell concurring).
See Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-84 (1972); Note, "Liberty," "Property," and
Procedural Due Process, 5 CONN. L. RaV. 685, 690-93 (1973).
45 Governmental deprivation of [a protected] interest must be accompanied by mini-
mum procedural safeguards, including some form of notice and a hearing. Arnett v.
Kennedy, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 1649 (1974) (Justice Powell concurring).
Before a person is deprived of a protected interest, he must be afforded opportunity
for some kind of a hearing. . . . Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7
(1972).
See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81, 86 (1972); Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502-
03 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
378-79 (1971).
46 The question is not merely the "weight" of the individual's interest, but whether the
nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the "liberty or property"
language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972).
See note 44 supra.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
For a liberty, however, "weight" cannot be entirely excluded from the first-
phase analysis.47 Some valuing is inevitably necessary to determine if a particular
limitation of freedom rises to the level of a fourteenth amendment deprivation
of liberty.4" This valuation is affected by the extent to which the deprivation
has subjected the individual to "grievous loss."49 When state action has damaged
an individual's good name so that his reputation in the community or ability
to gain employment is impaired, the state must provide due process." As a
guide to this valuation, Roth states that ". . . there can be no doubt that the
meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed."51
The second-phase analysis determines what process is due.12 In the par-
ticular circumstances under consideration, what procedures will satisfy the due
process mandate? The court must "weigh" the individual interest in avoiding
the deprivation against the state interest in summary adjudication.3 Greater
deprivations will generally require more formalized procedural protections. Only
in extraordinary situations will the state interest be so compelling as to defeat
the individual interest in some form of prior hearing.54
IV. Vail and Lopez: Lower Court Application of Roth
to Short Suspensions
The Supreme Court's new analytical framework was first applied to public
school suspensions in Vail v. Board of Education.5 Vail held that access to
education is a protected interest requiring some prior hearing. For suspensions
greater than five days, the court required Dixon safeguards. 6 In balancing the
47 This note will not treat property interests in detail since the courts have considered
education to be a protected liberty. It is worthwhile to note that some earlier decisions in-
dicate reduced protection for "property": "It is sufficient where only property rights are
concerned that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial determi-
nation." Ewing v. Mytinger and Casselbury, 339 U.S. 594, 599 '(1950). Also see Philips v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589, 595-97 (1931). However these decisions were
explained by Roth as "rare and extraordinary situations." 408 U.S. at 570 n.7. Also, both
Fuentes and Bell held that "property" deprivations require a prior hearing. Note 43 supra.
48 For example in Roth, denial of reemployment to respondent Roth certainly restricted
his liberty in the broadest sense of the word. He was no longer free to teach at Wisconsin
State University. However this particular freedom was not important enough to be a four-
teenth amendment liberty. 408 U.S. at 575.
49 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com-
mittee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951). "Grievous loss" pertains more to the second-
phase balancing process than to the first phase and was cited by both Goldberg and McGrath
in the context of the traditional balancing approach to procedural due process. See note 41
and accompanying text supra. However, at least so far as "grievous loss" means loss of good
name, it applies to the first phase. This is clear from Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-74.
50 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
51 408 U.S. at 572.
52 See note 44 supra.
53 This second-phase weighing is essentially the same process as the traditional due pro-
cess balancing of interests. See notes 41 & 49 and accompanying text supra. For a good
example of the application of this balancing process see Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
483-90 (1972). For a discussion balancing the interests involved in short suspensions see
text accompanying notes 89-125 infra.
54 See text accompanying note 26 supra and notes 119-25 infra.
55 354 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.H. 1973). It should be noted that the Supreme Court by-
passed an opportunity to apply their guidelines to short suspensions when they denied cer-
tiorari to Linwood v. Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 763 '(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027
(1972).
56 See note 10 supra.
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interests involved, the court gave great weight to the administrative burden of
providing Dixon protection for short suspensions.57 For this reason, the court
concluded that an "informal administrative consultation" will satisfy the prior
hearing requirement for suspensions of five days or less.
With the possible exception of Black Students5 8 Vail is the furthest exten-
sion of Dixon to short suspensions. It complies with the clear dictates of Roth
by requiring some form of hearing before any suspension, short or long.59 But
Vail broke new ground by authorizing a reduced form of hearing for short sus-
pensions as an alternative to the written notice and adversary hearing of Dixon. °
This result can be viewed as a logical compromise between Dixon safeguards and
no safeguards. However, the "informal administrative consultation" is grounded
in practicality as well as logic. It is required in order that
... the student can know why he is being disciplined and so that the stu-
dent can have the opportunity to persuade the school official that the sus-
pension is not justified, e.g., that this is a situation of mistaken identity or
that there is some other compelling reason not to take action.61
The most recent contribution to short suspension law is Lopez V. Williams."S
A number of students were suspended from the Columbus, Ohio, public schools
during a period of racial tension involving student demonstrations in early 1971.
The findings of fact establish that at least some of them were suspended without
any form of prior hearing. Several of the students gave uncontroverted testi-
mony that they were not involved in misconduct."s The suspensions were im-
posed under an Ohio statute authorizing public school principals to impose
ten-day suspensions without prior notice and hearing." The student plaintiffs
claimed that this statute denied procedural due process.
Writing for a three-judge panel, Chief District Judge Joseph Kinneary
carefully followed the Supreme Court two-phase approach. He held that the
statutory right to public education is a protected liberty requiring some form of
prior hearing before deprivation, thereby invalidating the Ohio statute. The
court "weighed" the interest of school authorities in regulating discipline and
declined to specify a precise form of hearing:
If school administrators follow procedures which result in a fair factual
determination made after notice and an opportunity to defend against the
charges of misconduct, then no matter how informal the procedure, the
student has been accorded [due process] ....
57 354 F. Supp. at 603.
58 Note 36 and accompanying text supra.
59 Although Vail did not expressly consider emergency situations, this exception is in-
herent in due process. See text accompanying note 26 supra and notes 119-25 infra.
60 A university suspension case, Stricklin v. Regents, 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis. 1969),
reached a similar position by holding that even an emergency suspension required at least a
"preliminary hearing," less formal than a full hearing. The elements of a preliminary hear-
ing were defined in a subsequent case. Note 115 infra.
61 354 F. Supp. at 603.
62 Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973), prob. juris. noted sub. nom.,
Goss v. Lopez, 94 S. Ct. 1405 (1974).
63 See the fact findings as to Dwight Lopez and Betty Crome, 372 F. Supp. at 1284-86.
64 OH o Rav. CODE § 3313.66 (1972), cited in 372 F. Supp. at 1282.
65 372 F. Supp. at 1302.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The decision also recognized that student conduct creating serious disruptions
will justify suspension without a prior hearing. However even in such situations,
an adversary hearing should be held within 72 hours."8
V. Lopez in the Supreme Court
The school system appealed the district court decision directly to the Su-
preme Court where, under the name of Goss v. Lopez, probable jurisdiction
was noted in February, 1974. Although Dixon has been cited with approval,6"
the Court has never before taken a suspension case. Lopez affords an oppor-
tunity for the Court to clarify the status of education under the Constitution and
define procedural due process guidelines for discipline in the public schools.
A. Phase One: Is Access to Public Education a "Liberty"?
Judge Kinneary noted in Lopez that the "Supreme Court has not resolved
the question of whether a student's statutory right to an education is a liberty
which is protected by due process of law.""8 Until 1973, few courts would have
devoted much ink to this question. For years the lower federal courts had han-
dled suspension cases as if there was no doubt that access to public school is a
"liberty."6  However, in 1973 in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez7 the Court ruled that education is not a fundamental right guar-
anteed by the Constitution. This holding compelled the court in Lopez to re-
consider the constitutional status of public education, particularly the distinction
between fundamental rights and due process liberties.
The Rodriguez holding that education is not a fundamental right does not
necessarily determine the due process question. As Judge Kinneary recognized,
fundamental rights are important to equal protection, not due process.7 Funda-
mental rights are those "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."7
Due process liberties are not restricted to constitutionally guaranteed rights.
"Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is
free to pursue. . . ."" Or as Justice Stewart once noted: "One may not have
a constitutional right to go to Bagdad, but the Government may not prohibit
one from going there unless by means consonant with due process of law."7 A
66 Id.
67 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n. 9 (1970); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 n.2 (1969).
68 372 F. Supp. at 1297.
69 "It would seem beyond argument that the right to receive a public school education
is a basic personal right or liberty." Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (D.
Mass. 1971). See Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1971);
Graham v. Knutzen, 351 F. Supp. 642, 664 (D. Neb. 1972); Sullivan v. Houston Indepen-
dent School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1172 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (education is a fundamental
right); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 990 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
70 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (property tax system of supporting public education not violative
of equal protection).
71 372 F. Supp. at 1298.
72 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
73 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 572 (1972).
74 Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1961), quoted in Cafeteria Workers
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961).
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survey of due process cases shows that many interests which are not constitution-
ally guaranteed have been protected. 5 Clearly, as Lopez concluded, Rodriguez
does not control the first-phase analysis."
In determining whether access to public schools is a protected liberty, the
Supreme Court should consider its own pronouncements on the importance of
education to society. Of particular note, Rodriguez itself endorsed the state-
ment in Brown v. Board of Education8 that "education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments."7 Because of its esteemed
status, denying due process protection to public education could not easily be
reconciled with other decisions safeguarding less elevated interests."0
Although not conclusive, several Supreme Court cases go far toward hold-
ing that education is a "liberty." Fifty years ago the Court said that liberty
"includes . . . not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual . . . to acquire useful knowledge. . . ,""s Two years later in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,82 the Court reaffirmed this statement by holding that
"the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control"83 is protected by due process. In view of this au-
thority, it would be very surprising if the Supreme Court contravened Lopez's
holding that the right to public education is a "liberty."8 4
Could the Court, while sustaining Lopez on the constitutional status of
public education, hold that only long and not short exclusions from school are
protected interests? They cannot if they wish to adhere to Roth and Morissey v.
Brewer.8 5 To determine if an interest is protected, its nature not its weight is
considered. The nature of a short suspension cannot be distinguished from a
long one. They are both deprivations of access to public education. They differ
only in weight.8" "Weight" pertains to the first-phase analysis only in the valuing
75 For a list of interests which have been given due process protection by the Supreme
Court see Lopez v. William, 372 F. Supp. at 1297.
76 In the spring 1974 term, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed another opinion
by Judge Kinneary in which he recognized the inapplicability of fundamental rights to due
process:
... while education is not a fundamental right, that does not mean that the uni-
versity may arbitrarily dismiss a student without due process of law. Kister v. Bd.
of Regents, 365 F. Supp. 27, 39 (S.D. Ohio 1973), summarily aff'd, 94 S. Ct. 855
(1974) (constitutionality of Ohio statute authorizing emergency measures for col-
lege disruptions was upheld).
77 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) '(Justice Brennan concurring).
78 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
79 Id. at 493, cited in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
at 29.
80 E.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (the right to resident status for college
tuition); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (the right to a driver's license); Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (the right to avoid the stigma of a publicly posted pro-
hibition against purchasing liquor).
81 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 '(1923).
82 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
83 Id. at 534.
84 Access to public education is probably a "property" as well as a "liberty." Lopez im-
plied as much while declining to consider the question. 372 F. Supp. at 1299 n. 16. The
state-created right to education is an entitlement that appears to meet the standards enun-
ciated in Roth. 408 U.S. at 577. Also see note 47 supra.
85 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See text accompanying note 46 supra.
86 "While the length and consequent severity of a deprivation may be another factor to
weigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing, it is not decisive of the basic right to a
prior hearing of some kind." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972).
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of a liberty after its nature has been determined in order to decide if it deserves
fourteenth amendment status.8 As explained by Judge Kinneary:
If education is a protected liberty when expulsion is involved, then it re-
mains a liberty when suspension occurs. The right to an education is the
interest being afforded procedural protection. It either is, or is not a liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The difference between expulsion and
suspension becomes important only when the Court confronts the question
of what process is due to protect the Fourteenth Amendment liberty.""
B. Phase Two: Balancing the Interests
The constitutional issue in Lopez will be settled if the Court agrees with
Judge Kinneary's first-phase analysis. Since the challenged Ohio statute requires
no hearing before a ten-day suspension, it is invalid if education is a "liberty." 9
The Court could therefore refrain from considering other issues. However, in
the interest of imposing some order on the morass of lower court decisions, the
Court will likely proceed to balance the interests involved and outline some
procedural guidelines. Such a balancing process requires that each of the various
interests be identified and then assessed according to its relative importance.
1. The Student Interest
The interest of the high school student is to avoid the harm associated with
a suspension from school. Compulsory attendance laws attest to the high value
which society places on education. The courts have often endorsed this societal
judgment." Judge Doyle of the Western District of Wisconsin observed in the
context of an indefinite suspension that "to deny . . .access to a public high
school . . . is to inflict . . .irreparable injury" and took judicial notice of "the
social, economic and psychological value and importance today of receiving a
public education through twelfth grade."
91
A suspension from school for even a few days may cause substantial harm.
Often a suspended student receives zeros for missed academic work with no
opportunity for make-up. 2 As one court explained:
87 If the Court departs from their previous approach and distinguishes the "nature"
of short and long suspensions, in order to deny protection for short suspensions they would
also need to find that short suspensions do not damage future employment potential or com-
munity reputation. See notes 49 & 50 and accompanying text supra. Such a finding would
not be warranted. See text accompanying notes 94-97 infra.
88 372 F. Supp. at 1300.
89 Conceivably the court could determine that short suspensions are an "extraordinary
situation" where the state interest justifies summary action. Such a holding would not be
consonant with discussions that have limited the reach of "extraordinary situations." See
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-92 & n.23 (1972). See also text accompanying note
26 supra and notes 119-25 infra.
90 Note 77 and accompanying text supra.
91 Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 704 (W.D. Wis.), aff'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). Also see Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369, 373-75
(5th Cir. 1964); Black Students ex rel. Shoemaker v. Williams, 317 F. Supp. 1211, 1216
(M.D. Fla. 1970); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 208-09 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
92 E.g., Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. at 1292; Vail v. Bd. of Educ., 354 F. Supp. at
603 n. 4. For this reason, the Director of Pupil Personnel of the Columbus Public Schools
testified in Lopez that "any absence from school may have negative educational effects."
372 F. Supp. at 1292.
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[T]he "magnitude" of a penalty should be gauged by its effect upon the
student and not simply meted out by formula. For example, a suspension
of even one hour could be quite critical to an individual student if that
hour encompassed a final examination that provided for no "make-up."' s
Probably even more significant than the academic harm directly associated
with missing school are the collateral effects. Suspensions commonly become
part of a student's permanent school record and thus may adversely affect
future opportunities for college admission and employment. Several decisions
have noted the gravity of this disciplinary record.. 4
A student may also suffer psychological harm from the stigmatization of a
school suspension. Suspension represents a judgment that a student is a trouble-
maker. Educators have documented the self-fulfilling effects of teacher attitudes
toward students." Psychologists testified in Lopez that suspensions cause lowered
self-esteem, resentment of school authorities, and withdrawal." These same
effects were examined in some detail in Sullivan v. Houston Independent School
District where the court pungently observed that
suspension is a particularly humiliating punishment evoking images of the
public penitent of medieval Christendom and colonial Massachusetts,
the outlaw of the American West, and the ostracized citizen of classical
Athens. Suspension is an officially-sanctioned judgement that a student be
for some period removed beyond the pale.
9 7
The quantum of harm flowing from a particular short suspension cannot
be precisely measured. In some cases it may be relatively insignificant. How-
ever, threats of reduced employment potential, lowered community status, and
resultant adverse psychological effects accompany any short suspension. Since
this potential for great harm is always present, the student interest in avoiding
even a short suspension should substantially tip the Supreme Court balancing
scales.
2. The Interest of the Schools
What are the corresponding interests of the public schools? School adminis-
trators, acting under the authority of school boards, are responsible for main-
taining an educational atmosphere in the schools. This important responsibility
requires concurrent broad authority to control student conduct. Therefore,
school officials have an interest in avoiding restrictions on their ability to respond
flexibly to varying disciplinary problems. The courts have vigorously and con-
93 Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 967 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1972).
94 Hatter v. Los Angeles City High School Dist., 452 F.2d 673, 674 (9th Cir. 1971);
Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1393 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
95 For a short discussion with references to other sources see Sullivan v. Houston Inde-
pendent School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1157 n. 9 (S.D. Tex. 1971). See generally, D.
FADER, THE NAKED CHILDREN (1971); J. HOLT, How CHILDREN FAIL '(1964); C. SILBER-
MAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM 138 (1970).
96 372 F. Supp. at 1292. See also Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Disciplines:
Probing the Constitutional outline, 119 U. PA. L. Rzv. 545, 575-76 (1971).
97 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1172 '(S.D. Tex. 1971).
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sistently recognized this interest as well as its constitutional limits.98 "Courts
do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily
operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate
basic constitutional values."99 While defining due process procedures for the
schools is a proper judicial function,' 0 the procedures should be designed so
as not to unduly limit discretion in the administration of school discipline.'0
Of course, as a basic constitutional value, due process must prevail if minimum
procedural safeguards infringe on school authority.
The schools also have an interest in avoiding procedures which unduly tax
school resources. Several courts have propounded the view that if Dixon
procedures were required before short suspensions, the procedures themselves
would be disruptive. 2 For this reason, Vail required only an "informal admin-
istrative consultation" for suspensions shorter than six days.0
The only case to elaborate on this view is Banks v. Board of Public Instruc-
tion.' There, a hypothetical discussion of classroom misconduct buttresses the
conclusion that prior hearings are disruptive. However, as previously ex-
plained,"5 this discussion did not recognize the emergency situation exception to
general due process requirements. If student misconduct is so severe that learning
can be maintained only by immediate removal from school, extreme physical
violence for instance, a prior hearing is dispensable even if normally required.'
In actuality, classroom misconduct is usually not as drastic as Banks assumed
and seldom warrants summary action. Traditionally, when an unruly student
does not respond to the classroom teacher, the learning processes are maintained
by sending the student to the administrator responsible for discipline.0 7 If the
student is particularly recalcitrant, the administrator may decide that short
suspension would be appropriate. However, sound educational policy requires
that even short suspensions be sparingly employed.' In the relatively infrequent
instances warranting suspension, a hearing could be scheduled so as to minimize
98 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). For addi-
tional authority see Lopez, 372 F. Supp. at 1300.
99 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
100 DeJesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70, 74 (D. Conn. 1972).
101 Judge Rives in Dixon was sensitive to this interest. The safeguards which he defined
are only broad, the "rudimentary elements of fair play." 294 F.2d at 159. Wisely, none of
the suspension decisions have attempted to define procedures more rigid than those of Dixon.
See note 10 supra.
102 See the discussion of Banks v. Bd. of Public Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla.
1970) accompanying note 27 supra and the discussion of Baker v. Downey City School Bd.,
307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969) accompanying note 12 supra.
103 354 F. Supp. at 603. Vail is discussed in the text accompanying notes 55-61 supra.
104 314 F. Supp. at 290-91.
105 See text accompanying notes 29-32.
106 The emergency situation in the school setting is discussed in the text accompanying
note 26 and notes 119-25.
107 E.g., Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. at 1283. See generally J. GRAY, THE TEACrER'S
SURViVAL GumE, 27, 35-70 (1967).
108 The Dade County, Florida, school regulations under consideration in Banks recognized
this principle:
[S]uspension[s] . . . are extreme measures to be employed only when all available
school resources are exhausted and school personnel are unable to cope constructively
with pupil misconduct. 314 F. Supp. at 291.
See Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1171 '(S.D. Tex.
1971); M. NOLTE, GumI. TO SCHOOL LAW 78 (1969); Harwood, Suspension: A Valid Dis-
ciplinary Tool?, 44 CLEAIUNG HousE 29, 30 (1969).
[December 1974]
[Vol. 50:364]
interference with school activities. Consequently, the view that a prior hearing
is disruptive is not as important as Banks suggests.
The interest of schools in promoting respect for the Constitution and legal
processes should also be weighed."0 9 As Justice Jackson wrote in 1943:
That [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupu-
lous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not
to... teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes."10
Arbitrarily imposed discipline generates disrespect for the schools and for
society."" If a student perceives that a suspension was judiciously imposed, he is
less likely to suffer psychological harm and more likely to reevaluate his con-
duct." 2 In this respect, the interests of the schools as well as students are pro-
moted by providing greater due process protections."3
VI. Conclusion
When the interests of both sides have been placed upon the balancing pans,
the scales should finally come to rest at that point where, minimizing infringe-
ment on state interests, the magnitude of the individual deprivation is fully ac-
counted for. In the case of short suspensions, the student interest in avoiding
great potential harm considerably outweighs the school interest in avoiding
burdensome procedures."' Short suspensions should be imposed, therefore, only
when substantial procedural protections have been provided. However, these
procedures should not be too narrowly defined. The school systems must be
trusted to implement effective protections within broad guidelines that reserve
a maximum of discretion to school authorities.
The range of procedural protection which can be applied is represented at
the low end by the informal consultation of Vail. It is gross injustice not to give
the reason for discipline and allow the student to explain or deny his conduct
prior to imposing a suspension in all but emergency situations."' At the other
109 The Supreme Court has recognized a state interest in fostering respect for law in other
procedural due process cases. See Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 496 (1972); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970).
110 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1934). See Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479. 487 (1960).
111 Justice Frankfurter's discussion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. u. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 171-72 '(1951) partially quoted in note 23, supra, emphasizes the increased
moral authority attached to decisions reached through procedures which are perceived to be fair.
112 See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d at 157; C. SILBERMAN, CGusrs iN
THaE Cr.ssRooM 340 (1970); O'Toole, Summary Suspension of Students Pending a Dis-
ciplinary Hearing: How Much Process Is Due? 1 J. LAw & EDuC. 383, 400 (1972).
113 Following due process may enhance operation of the schools. DeBruin, Education and
Due Process, 90 EDUCATION 174, 182 (1969).
114 "A prior hearing always imposes some costs of time, effort, and expense, and it is often
more efficient to dispense with the opportunity for such a hearing. But these rather ordinary
costs cannot outweigh the constitutional right." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n. 22
(1972).
115 The elements of the "preliminary hearing" suggested in Stricklin v. Regents, 297
F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis. 1969) were defined in a subsequent case in the same court, Buck v.
Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 '(W.D. Wis. 1970): (1) Evaluate reliability of the accusing
information. (2) Decide whether the conduct warrants prompt removal from school. (3) In-
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end of the procedural range is Dixon: prior notice with a statement of charges,
an impartial hearing with opportunity to refute damaging evidence and present
a defense, and penalty imposed only on substantial evidence.' These safeguards
are nothing more than the "rudimentary elements of fair play.""1 7 While insur-
ing basic fairness, they are not unduly restrictive. The schools have much latitude
within the broad definition to implement notice and hearing requirements within
their particular capabilities.' Accordingly, guidelines similar to Dixon should
be promulgated for short suspensions. The relative severity of the sanction
demands these basic procedural protections.
In addition to setting procedural guidelines, the Court should circumscribe
the exceptions to their application. The "emergency situation" for schools should
be defined to reflect two competing considerations: School officials must feel free
to act decisively in seriously disruptive situations; and conversely, if the emer-
gency exception is defined too broadly, procedural guidelines will be of little prac-
tical consequence."'
All courts that have considered the question agree that school officials must
have authority to take summary action to restore order when mass riots or
demonstrations occur."2 In addition, Lopez allows "immediate removal of a
student whose conduct disrupts the academic atmosphere of the school, endangers
fellow students, teachers or school officials, or damages property.""' This
standard states three separate situations allowing summary removal. The latter
two, conduct endangering others or damaging property, are clearly appropriate.
However a standard that allows no prior hearing when student conduct "disrupts
the academic atmosphere of the school" is too broad."' Such language could
encompass waving at a friend when walking by a classroom, thereby effectively
negating a prior hearing requirement. A better phrase would be: "conduct so
disruptive that continuation of the educational processes is impossible.""'
form the student of the nature of the offense and allow him an opportunity to make a state-
ment. If he denies the charges, further investigation should be made before imposing a
suspension. See note 60 supra.
116 Note 10 supra.
117 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d at 159.
118 For one suggested hearing model see DeBruin, supra note 113, at 175. See also NA-
TIONAL EDUCATION AssocIATIoN, CODE OF STUDENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 38-42
(1971).
119 See Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1170-71 (S.D.
Tex. 1971).
120 See e.g., Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. at 1301; Williams v. Dade County School
Bd., 441 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1971); Banks v. Bd. of Public Instruction, 314 F. Supp.
285, 291 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
121 372 F. Supp. at 1302.
122 Id. Judge Kinneary may have had in mind the Tinker standard: "substantial disrup-
tion of or material interference with school activities." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969). However, this standard is not necessarily appro-
priate for due process. Tinker defines when the schools may restrict conduct which would,
if not disruptive, be protected by the first amendment. Due process does not affect a school's
right to regulate conduct but requires only that it be regulated in accordance with fair
procedures. An exception to due process needs to be more restrictive than Tinker since due
process defines only how not when conduct can be regulated.
123 In fashioning due process guidelines and their exceptions, the Court should note the
educational value of disruptive behavior. M. NOLTE, DUTIES AND LIABILITIS OF SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATORS 186 (1973); C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM 113-57 (1970);
Ladd, Toward an Educationally Appropriate Legal Definition of Disruptive Behavior, 7
EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION QUARTERLY 1, 14 (1971).
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Even for emergency suspensions, Lopez requires an informal adversary hear-
big within 72 hours.2 4 This requirement prevents a temporary suspension from
extending indefinitely for lack of administrative follow-through.2 5 A 72-hour
limit is reasonable. When three days have passed, a suspended student has already
borne a heavy penalty for his conduct. Further absence from school can be
justified only if the student is given a fair opportunity to respond to the charges
against him.
Michael Snyder
124 372 F. Supp. at 1302. This requirement is crucial to Judge Kinneary's final disposition
of the case. It is clear that at least some of the student suspensions in question fit the emergency
exception to a prior hearing requirement. However, since no hearing was provided within a
reasonable time after the initial action, the students were not accorded due process.
125 The facts of several cases suggest that this has happened too often. See Dunn v. Tyler
Independent School Dist., 460 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp.
1379 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Rumler v. Bd. of School Trustees, 327 F. Supp. 729 (D.S.C. 1971);
Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
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